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Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act stipulates specific roles for the CEO, CFO, and the Auditor. However, the role of the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), usually in charge of IT governance (ITG), is implicit. This is despite the fact that in many 
firms, accounting and financial information and reporting systems either incorporate or are embedded in sophisticated 
information systems. Through a discussion of the literature, this paper argues that CIOs contribute to the design, 
implementation, and governance of these information systems which are fundamental to the SOX Act Compliance 
success. Hypotheses are generated and tested using panel data on the hiring of CIOs between 1999-2005. The results 
reveal that, after the enactment of the SOX Act in 2002, many firms created new CIO positions and staffed them with 
internal hires. Many of these new hires reported to the CEOs and had a strong business background characterized by 
graduate degrees in business administration (MBAs). 
 
Key words: IT governance (ITG), Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act, Chief Information Officer (CIO), MBA, CEO, CFO. 
INTRODUCTION 
The potential pay-offs from Information Technology (IT) continues to drive firms to make huge investments in IT 
resources (Liu and Ravichandran, 2008; Luftman and Ben-Zvi, 2010).  In many firms, these investments are almost 
eight percent (8%) of the total revenue. Moreover, in the IT intensive industries they are almost forty percent (40%) of 
the firm’s total capital expenditures (Karanja and Patel, 2012). For instance, in the 2009 report of the top 500 
Information Systems (IS) innovators by InformationWeek magazine, IT budget levels in the Banking and Financial 
industry accounted for 8.0 and 7.6 percent of annual revenues in 2008 and 2009 respectively (Murphy, 2009).  
 
However, a major impediment to the realization of the full economic benefits from these IT investments is the 
misalignment between IT and business strategies (Byrd, Lewis, and Bryan, 2006; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993). 
For quite some time now, the appropriate ways to realize this elusive alignment has been a key concern for many IT 
executives and other members of the Top Management Teams (TMTs) (Armstrong and Sambamurthy, 1999; Preston 
and Karahanna, 2008). Numerous efforts have been made towards realizing this alignment although there is still more 
pressure especially due to the burden brought about by government legislation.  
 
In order to regulate and protect investors in the public markets, the US federal government has enacted a number of 
legislation in the past. Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (SOX, 2002) is one of the most recent legislation. The promulgation 
of this Act led to a resurgence in the desire to achieve IT and business strategic alignment as part of firms’ compliance 
efforts, albeit at a cost. A study from Emory University reported that the cost of SOX Act compliance is 148% of all the 
other compliance costs (Velichety et al., 2004). Although a considerable amount of research has been carried out 
exploring the IT and business strategy alignment phenomenon (Luftman, Papp, and Brier, 1999; Tallon and 
Pinsonneault, 2011), there seems be a dearth of research work that investigates how to align IT to achieve the SOX Act 
compliance objectives of the firm. 
 
One of the main components of the IT and business strategy alignment model is IT Governance (ITG) (Henderson and 
Venkatraman, 1993).  Hence, the study seeks to investigate specifically the effects of the SOX Act and its impact on 
ITG. In the SOX Act compliance guidelines, the role of the ITG is implicit although in most firms, accounting 
information and financial reporting systems are embedded under sophisticated IT based systems. Nevertheless, the Act 
requires the TMT to document and test the relevant IT controls as means of insuring and guaranteeing the reliability of 
the accounting and financial information. Moreover there is, for instance, a widely held view that computer based 
information systems’ security is a requirement, though implicit, of the internal control structures and mandates of the 
SOX Act. Therefore, the security, efficiency, and effectiveness of the IT unit in a firm will contribute towards ensuring 
the reliability of the financial reports more so due to the inherent characteristic of the digital records. The 
implementation of SOX and the role of IT are closely linked; this is evident from the fact that firms are benefiting from 
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improved information security from compliance efforts associated with SOX (Spears and Cole, 2006). Hence, the IT 
unit is viewed as a necessary but not a sufficient partner in the firm SOX Act compliance initiative. 
 
This paper investigates the impact of the SOX Act on the corporate IT unit, hereby represented by the hiring or creation 
of the CIOs positions (CIO is used here to represent the subset of all Senior IT leaders in various organizations who are 
referenced using different names such as CIO, Chief Technology Officer, Vice President of IT, Director of IT etc.). The 
CIO has the utmost responsibility for IT in a firm and the associated responsibilities include setting IT strategy, 
directing IT investments, managing IT outsourcing initiatives, information security, ensuring data integrity, among 
others (CIO, 2002; Banker et al., 2011). Due to the IT and SOX Act relationship, it would be expected that firms would 
devote IT resources in meeting the compliance requirements. The responsibility and accountability of these resources 
would be under the office of the CIO.   
 
This research makes a number of contributions. First, the researchers argue that while SOX Act does not explicitly 
require the CIOs to sign off on the accounting and financial statements and reports, their role is fundamental in ensuring 
that the firm meets the compliance standards. This is because, for the most part, the tools that are required for 
congregating, assessing, reporting, and implementing the financial statements are facilitated by and are under the 
control of the IT unit. Second, the researchers examine the relationship between the SOX Act and the ITG by 
illustrating how the various provisions of the SOX Act are implemented via IS. Third, the paper extends the debate of 
the relationship between the SOX Act compliance and corporate restructuring and transformation, which in this case is 
represented by the ITG. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains background overview of 
the SOX Act followed by a section that illustrates the relationship between the SOX Act and ITG. Next, we present the 
methodology for data collection and the results. The article concludes with a discussion of the study’s implications to 
both the academia and industry. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act 
Firms serve a number of roles that include the creation of wealth to the stakeholders through transparent business 
practices and processes (Wheelen and Hunger, 2001; King, 2007). Likewise, among the various duties of the US 
Federal government, usually implemented through a number of agencies, such as the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission), is to promote good business practices, level the playing field, protect investors, instill confidence in the 
capital markets, and ultimately facilitate the creation of wealth (Denis, 2001; La Porta et al., 2000). Following a number 
of accounting scandals, the SOX Act was enacted in 2002 to mitigate against future accounting malpractices as well as 
restore stakeholders’ confidence in public companies accounting and reporting systems. 
 
For the firms, potential benefits that accrue from compliance includes increased investor confidence in the financial 
reports, improved corporate disclosure, more reliable financial data as a result of effective internal control systems over 
the data as well as detection and deterrent of corporate financial fraud (Rezaee and Jain, 2006). However, the role of IT 
in the SOX compliance is not explicit and there are still different schools of thought with diverse opinions on the role of 
IT in the firm compliance initiatives. A review of the literature revealed that a number of researchers have carried out 
several studies investigating various dimensions of SOX Act and how they relate to the firm. A brief synopsis of some 
of these studies is shown in the following table, Table 1.  
 
However, based on our literature review, there seems to be a dearth of literature that investigates how the enactment of 
the SOX Act has impacted the ITG component of the firms. It is this research gap that this study seeks to narrow. 
 
IT Governance (ITG) 
Corporate governance encompasses the decision making processes, structures, and systems through which organizations 
are directed, managed, and controlled for the purpose of generating value to the stakeholders (Denis, 2001; Turnbull, 
1997). ITG on the other hand, has been recognized as an integral part of corporate governance as espoused in its 
definition by the IT Governance Institute (ITGI, 2003, p.10), in which ITG “consists of the leadership and 
organizational structures and processes that ensure that the organization’s IT sustains and extends the organization’s 
strategies and objectives”.  ITG “is about who is entitled to make major decisions, who has input, and who is 
accountable for implementing those decisions” (Broadbent and Weill, 2003, p.1). Also, ITG is defined as “the decision 
rights and accountability framework for encouraging desirable behaviors in the use of IT” (Weill and Richard, 2002, 
p.1-2; Weill and Ross, 2004, p. 4). IT organizational, leadership, accountability, and behaviors are manifested in 
multiple facets that includes directing IT endeavors of the firm, developing organizational visions, and setting IT 
strategic goals and directions. 
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Author (s) Study Thesis Results 
Brown and Nasuti, 2005. Relationship between ERP and SOX 
Act. 
Competencies in project management, change management, and 
software integration are key to meeting SOX Act compliance. 
Eldridge and Kealey, 2005. Examine costs of the new internal 
control audit requirement of SOX Act. 
On average, in the firms studied between 2003 and 2004, audit 
fees increased by $2.3 million. 
Leih, 2006. Effect of SOX Act requirements on 
project management. 
SOX Act results in increased project management formalization, 
increased project durations, and use of PM software to support 
auditing activities. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney, and LaFond, 2007. 
Study the effect of SOX Act internal 
control deficiencies on firm risk and 
cost of equity. 
Internal control deficiencies associated with significantly higher 
idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity. 
Hall and Liedtka, 2007. How does SOX Act impact large scale 
IT outsourcing. 
In responding to SOX Act, firms should avoid outsourcing IT 
projects outright due to the inherent risks associated with large IT 
projects, unless outsourcing is a profitable outcome. 
Li, Lim, and Wang, 2007. Internal and external factors that 
influence IT control governances. 
Fewer material weaknesses found in firms with more 
experienced IT leaders, CIO positions, long tenured CEOs, and 
higher percentage of independent boards of directors. 
Hammersley, Myers, and 
Shakespeare, 2008. 
Market reaction to the disclosure of 
internal control weaknesses under 
section 302 of the SOX Act. 
Negative price reactions to the disclosure of internal control 
weaknesses and material weaknesses. 
Asthana, Balsam, and Kim, 
2009. 
Study how Enron, Andersen, and SOX 
Act impacted the US market for audit 
services. 
Both average audit fees and premium charged by the Big Four 
audit firms increased significantly in 2002. Also bigger and 
riskier clients faced larger increases in their audit fees. 
Masli, Peters, Richardson, 
and Sanchez, 2010. 
Benefits associated with internal control 
monitoring technologies. 
During the post SOX period, lower likelihood of material 
weakness occurrence, smaller increases in audit fees and audit 
delays in firms implementing internal control monitoring 
technology. 
Haislip, Masli, Richardson, 
and Sanchez, 2011. 
Impact of IT material weakness on 
executive and director turnover, and 
changes in IT governance. 
Firms with higher IT material weakness experience more CEO, 
CFO, and director turnover rates and replacements have higher 
IT knowledge. 
Morris, 2011. Do ERPs implementations affect 
internal controls over financing 
reporting? 
Firms implementing ERPs are less likely to report internal 
control weakness. 
Wallace, Lin, and Cefaratti, 
2011. 
Examine extent to which IT security 
controls are implemented and integrated 
into firms internal controls 
environments. 
IT controls implementations are premised on whether the firm is 
private or public, the size of the firm, industry affiliations, and 
training of internal auditors and IT personnel. 
 
Table 1: A Sample of Prior IT Related Studies Investigating Various Dimensions of SOX Act 
 
Role of ITG in the SOX Act compliance initiative 
The role of the IT unit in the firm SOX Act compliance efforts is evidenced by the fact that this legislation targets 
management accountability and operating efficiencies; two areas tightly coupled with ITG practices. The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) explicitly identifies the use of IT as a tool to enhance 
internal controls monitoring. IT can be used to monitor internal controls tasks like automation of routine control tests, 
enhancement of risk assessments, evaluation and documentation of controls, and management and communication of 
control assurance activities (COSO 2009). For example, Masli et al. (2010) found that IT related internal controls 
technologies assist in decreasing the number of material weaknesses in the financial statements. Moreover, the 
widespread use of IT within organizations implies that their internal controls are either fully automated by being 
embedded within the information systems or combine automated and manual controls (Braganza and Franken, 2007). 
One of the key roles of ITG is the management of IT investments. 
 
According to Zuboff (1985) and Schein (1992), firms make IT investments in order to automate, informate, and/or 
transform business processes. Automation of IT investments mechanize business processes by replacing/complimenting 
the labor intensive, expensive, and often unpredictable human labor with IT infrastructures. Informate IT investments 
empower employees through the provision of IT infrastructures that facilitate the flow of information across the 
organizational hierarchical management and operations levels. Transformational IT-enabled initiatives on the other hand 
are geared towards changing or reshaping the industry rules of the game by restructuring and reengineering the business 
processes and thus altering both the firm and industry competitive forces. Transformational IT investments also alter 
how the firm interacts with its suppliers and other stakeholders along the value chain. The following table, Table 2, 
summarizes the relationship between some specific SOX Act sections and ITG and the impact of IT. 
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Principal executive and financial 
officers (CEO and CFO) prepare 
and attach a statement to the 
periodic report attesting to the 
accuracy of the financial 
statements and disclosures therein. 
Ensure IS systems supporting the 
financial reporting processes are 
auditable, complete, provide accurate 
data and information of when, where, 
and by who accounting and financial data 
















Any off-balance sheet transactions 
and relationships involving 
unsolicited entities with the 
potential of affecting the current or 
future company financial standing 
must be included in the quarterly 
and annual reports. 
Implement financial systems capable of 
providing timely, accurate, and 
consistent data both internal and external 
to the firm. Have efficient inter and intra-
organizational ISs that enable data 
sharing and risk management with all the 
stakeholders along the value chain. 













Auditors include an internal 
control report in the firm’s annual 
financial statement certifying the 
management’s responsibility in the 
creation, assessing, maintaining, 
and checking the effectiveness of 
the internal controls and processes.  
Regularly document and audit the 
processes performed by the IT unit. 
Incorporate data and information security 
control mechanisms. CIO collaborates 
with CEO and CFO constantly to ensure 
alignment of IT and firm strategy and 
any IT changes/modifications. 
IT Audit Systems, 












Speedily and accurately report any 
material changes affecting firm’s 
financial conditions or operations. 
Invest in real time-based IT systems 
capable of gathering, assimilating, and 
reporting financial data, and reports or 
otherwise on a rapid and current basis. 















falsifications or destruction of 
financial data or information 
punishable by a fine/ 20 years in 
jail or both. Auditors must keep 
audit reports/reviews for 5 years or 
face 10 years and or fine for 
violations. 
Guarantee the authenticity, consistency, 
and accuracy of financial records by 
setting and enforcing appropriate access 
control policies. Educate IT and related 
staff on importance of adhering to best 
practices when handling data and 
information. Report any data breaches on 
self or partners and ensure off site 



















Principal executives (CEO, CFO), 
certifies that accounting and 
financial reports are an accurate 
reflection of the firm’s financial 
position. Violations punishable by 
a fine and/or jail time. 
Educate CIO and IT staff on role of IT in 
SOX Act compliance. Encourage IT 
investments that facilitate compliance 
while yielding business value. 










Table 2: Relationship between a subset of SOX Act Sections and IT Governance 
 
Although there are other IT investments that firms make that do not seem to fall into any of these categories, they are 
nevertheless aimed at supporting or managing the intended results of automation, informating, or transforming the 
business processes. For instance, the hiring of CIOs is aimed at providing the relevant organizational capability to 
govern the IT resources either at the automation, informating, or transformation stages with the aim of generating 
economic rents. 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Although SOX Act, which regulates financial reporting, has very little direct relation or requirement for the corporate 
ITG, corporations rely heavily on IT processes in their daily financial management and periodic reporting activities. 
Thus, the role of ITG in the SOX compliance is a research domain that is increasingly getting more attention both in 
academia and in the business community (Schneier, 2004; Morris, 2011). High reliance on IT implies a very strong IT 
dependence for compliance with the SOX Act. 
 
SOX Act does not specifically require that CIOs certify or attest to the effectiveness of the internal controls of their 
firms. However, CIOs’ roles are implicit in that the responsibility of protecting the accounting and financial information 
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and the documents that the public relies on in making investments decisions rests with the IT unit. It is this business unit 
under the leadership of the CIO, which should guarantee that accounting data, financial documents, and business 
processes exhibit such traits as confidentiality, reliability, integrity, and are readily and only accessible to authorized 
users.  
 
Figure 1: Research Framework Illustrating the Relationship between the CEO, CFO, Auditor and CIO in the SOX Act Compliance 
Initiative 
From Figure 1 above, the facet of the SOX Act Compliance represented by the CIO takes the shape of a cloud to 
emphasis that it is not fixed in the matrix. As earlier acknowledged, SOX Act does not stipulate guidelines for the IT 
unit although we argue here that the role of CIO, who is in charge of ITG, is paramount in meeting the compliance 
requirements. 
 
The role of the CIOs in the post SOX period is exacerbated by the fact that IT costs associated with compliance 
activities have far outpaced the expenses associated with the Y2K compliance. For instance, in a multi-tiered review of 
the costs of compliance and executives opinion on issues concerning the SOX Act, 147 high level executives indicated 
that the average audit fees have risen by a range of between 55% for the S&P 500 to 84% for the S&P Small-Cap 
companies (Hartman, 2007). Given the nature and role of IT function in these processes, there is little doubt that the 
CEOs and CFOs will turn to the CIOs for reassurances. In fact, the CIOs have a vested interest in ensuring that the 
financial statements are accurate and the firm’s internal control are in compliance because any negative consequences of 
non-SOX Act compliance will indirectly affect them. 
 
In the modern firms, IT infrastructure in forms of computers, emails, intranets, Internet, Web 2.0 tools, and IT personnel 
are the backbone of the day-to-day environment and it is only prudent for the IT personnel and Top Management Teams 
(TMTs) to comprehend the scope and the enforcement provisions of the SOX Act (Bequai, 2003). Since the SOX Act 
does not include IT compliance provisions, it is the role of the firms to devise strategies for meeting the compliance 
requirements. One of the IT oriented strategies is increased attention to the IT unit which can be inferred through a 
number of developments, such as the creation of CIO positions and their subsequent hiring to coordinate and manage 
the IT unit. 
 
Consequently, we hypothesize as follows: 
 
Hypotheses 1a: The passage of the SOX Act of 2002 did result in changes in firms’ ITG structures represented by 
the hiring of Senior IT executives (CIOs). 
 
Hypotheses 1b: Following the enactment of the SOX Act of 2002, more firms created a new position of senior IT 
executives.  
 
Hypotheses 1c: Of the Senior IT executives who were hired (to fill existing and newly created positions) 
following the passage of the SOX Act of 2002, many were hired from within the organization. 
 
CIOs Reporting Structure 
The various roles of a CIO involve interacting, either formally or informally, with other members of the TMT and 
require an individual well versed with the various facets of the organization (Preston and Karahanna, 2009). Since the 
CIO is the highest IT executive, the importance that firms place on IT can be reflected by the CIO’s reporting structure. 
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The membership of the CIO in the TMT can also be interpreted to be an indicator of the role of IT in the overall 
organizational strategy, business and governance requirements, and ultimately value creation from IT. To facilitate the 
role of IT in the organizations, firms should have a formal and direct CIO reporting structure. The absence of a clear 
reporting structure hinders the role of a CIO, the alignment of IT and business strategy, and ultimately IT-based SOX 
Act compliance requirements.  
Although the CIO position has been in existence for the last three decades, there seems to be a lack of consensus on the 
ideal CIO reporting structure (Talbot, 2008; Wilson, 2007). Two dominant reporting structures based on the 
differentiation and cost leadership strategies calls for a CIO-CEO and CIO-CFO reporting hierarchy respectively 
(Banker et al. 2011). Thus, given the risk factors associated with non-compliance on the firm governance structure, we 
would expect firms to hire more CIOs to manage and coordinate the IT infrastructures and also require these CIOs to 
report to the CEOs. 
We hypothesize that, 
Hypotheses 2: Following the passage of the SOX act, firms hired CIOs and required them to report to the 
CEOs. 
CIOs Business Orientation 
CFOs are expected to have a good appreciation of both accounting and financial concepts, while marketing executives 
should be knowledgeable about sales. Likewise, a CIO is expected to have significant and deeper background in IT. 
However, since IT spans many spheres of the organization from accounting, marketing, research and development, to 
sales tracking and customer relationship management, CIOs are implicitly expected to be multi-talented. CIOs with 
more knowledge, experience, and skills that extend within and beyond the IT functions are better equipped to deliver 
business value through IT (Rasmussen, 2007). Such characteristics make them better and reliable partners, and not 
subordinates of the other top level executives who are key players in corporate governance. 
As such, in addition to having a technical background, we would expect firms to have CIOs who have a business 
background. CIOs who are well versed with the IT technical skills and capabilities and have a better appreciation of the 
business environment would be more effective in achieving the alignment of IT and business strategy which is a 
precursor to achieving SOX Act compliance status.  
Hypotheses 3: Following the passage of the SOX act, firms hired Senior IT executives and many of these 




Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This research utilizes an empirical method to test and support the assertion that a relationship exists between the SOX 
Act and firms’ ITG practices. An event study methodology was utilized to generate the data from Lexis Nexis wire 
index. Event study methodology has been used by many researchers to study specific issues. For example, Chatterjee et 
al. (2001) used a similar method in investigating the market reaction to the hiring of CIOs while Khallaf and Skantz 
(2011) extended their data and explored market reactions to the firm’s IT expertise. The method was adopted based on 
the fact that many firms issue a press release when they hire senior executives (Fee and Hadlock, 2004). Searches using 
the keywords “new”, or “create” together with various IT executives position titles were done.  
Two distinct time periods were used with the “event” being the passage of the SOX Act in 2002. The time periods were 
1999-2001 and 2003-2005.  They were chosen to reflect the pre and post Year 2000 (Y2K), the dot-com boom and bust 
years, as well as the promulgation of the SOX Act; periods that have been shown to have had an impact on various 
aspects of ITG (Anderson, Banker, and Ravindran, 2006). 
Results 
The search process generated hiring announcements and each entry was reviewed by the authors separately. The 
extracted data was recorded on a  spreadsheet and some of the entries included company name, IT executive’s title, hire 
date, newly created position or an existing position, internal or external hire, experience, and educational levels. The 
information was compared and where disagreements arose, the authors reviewed the announcements together and came 
to a consensus. The inter-rater reliability statistics were 0.86 (hiring IT executive), 0.96 (hire date), 0.93 (newly created 
position/existing position), 0.89 (external/internal hire), 0.93 (reporting structure), 0.95 (educational levels). Neuendorf 
(2002) argues that the reliability of content analysis studies using human coders should be based on the amount of 
agreement or correspondence among the coders. As such the values for the inter-coder reliability are well above the 0.8 
which is considered sufficient (Cohen, 1960; Landis & Koch, 1977).  
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In total, the search process yielded 1219 announcements out of which 870 were retained after data cleaning. As shown 
in Table 3 below, 295 announcements were eliminated because they were not related to the hiring of IT executives (for 
example, the search returned information about AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Labor – Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, due to the occurrence of “CIO”), while 54 announcements were eliminated because the hired IT 
executive was not the highest IT executive in the firm (for example, VP of IS or VP of IT who reports to a CTO or to a 
CIO). However, the data for the firms where the highest IT executive position is the VP of IS or VP of IT is included. 
 
Observations Based on Sample Selection Screening Criteria 
Total number of announcements 1219 
less announcements not related to hiring of IT executives (295) 
 less announcements not related to the highest IT executive  (54) 
Total number of valid IT related announcements 870 
 
Table 3: Sample Selection 
 
From these 870 firm announcements, there were 16 different titles that were used to designate an organization’s top IT 
executive. Majority of these IT Executives had the title CIO, (56% - value includes subtitles such as VPs) and CTO 
(37%) with the other 7% representing titles such as VP of IT/IS; however, there were two positions that had President 
(CTO & P) title. 
Analysis 
To empirically investigate the impact of SOX Act on the ITG represented by the hiring of top IT executives, an 
examination of the data on the hiring of CIOs from 1999 to 2005 (6 years of data) was done. A comparison sample was 
created by matching the sampled firms with their industry counterparts based on the 4-digit SIC codes. To create a 
matching sample, a list of all the firms in each 4-digit SIC code was generated from COMPUSTAT database and the list 
of all the firms that hired an IT executive was extracted. For instance, in 1999, there were 12,556 firms in all SIC codes 
in the COMPUSTAT database. Of these firms, 6,123 were represented in the group of 143 firms that hired an IT 
executive. To generate a comparison sample for the firms that hired an IT executive in 1999, 143 firms that hired an IT 
executive were eliminated from the total group sample to yield 5,980 firms that did not hire an IT executive. The 
procedure was repeated for all the other years (2000-2005). The process allowed the   out of the effect of the large 
number of firms that were created pre-Y2K period and also enabled the comparison of the hiring and non-hiring 
practices of firms in the same 4-digit SIC Codes. The following table, Table 4, shows the annual distribution for both 
types of firms. 
 
 Pre-SOX (1999-2001)  Post-SOX(2003-2005)  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Firms not hiring 5980 5669 5431 4027 3647 3859 3919 32532 
Hiring firms 143 152 121 95 106 118 135 870 
Total 6123 5821 5552 4122 3753 3977 4054 33402 
       
 Pre-SOX(1999-2001) Post-SOX(2003-2005)  Total 
Firms not hiring  17080 11425  28505 
Hiring firms 416 359  775 
Total 17496 11784  29280 
Table 4: Number of Firms in the Study Period 
In testing the hypotheses, two methods were used namely, frequency distribution of firms that hired and did not hire an 
IT executive during the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX time periods using a Chi-Square procedure and a proportions test for 
same periods following the methodology used by Gordon et al. (2006). The Chi-Square procedure was carried out to 
ascertain whether the distribution of the Pre and Post SOX values was due to chance. As shown in the following table, 
Table 5, the results indicate that the distribution of the firms that hired and did not hire an IT executive during the two 
time periods did not occur by chance (p-value<0.001).  The Chi-Square results are reiterated by the output from the 
Fisher’s exact probability test from the 2X2 contingency table. 
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Frequency distribution- X2 and Fisher's exact 
 Pre-Sox Post-Sox Total X2(1) Pr -Chi Fisher 
 Two sided one sided 
Firms not hiring 17080 11425 28505 12.22 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Hiring firms 416 359 775     
Total 17496 11784 29280     
 
Proportions of IT Executive hires 
Pre-Sox Post-Sox Diff Post-Pre Z-Score Diff>0 Pro(Z>z) No. of observations 
416/17080 359/11425    Pre-Sox Post-Sox Total 
2.44% 3.14% 0.71% 3.50 0.000 17496 11784 29280 
 
Table 5: Comparing the Firms That Hired and did not Hire an IT Executive 
The second test involves comparing the proportions of the firms before and after the SOX Act. As such, if the 
proportion of firms before the SOX Act is designated as Ppre and those after the SOX Act as Ppost, the null hypothesis 
can be stated as Ho: Ppost - Ppre=0. The goal here is to investigate whether Ppost > PPre. Thus, the alternative hypothesis 
becomes, Ha:Ppost - Ppre ≠ 0 and for a one sided test, Ha:Ppost > Ppre. The proportions test for the two time periods 
provides statistical  support for the argument that firms hired more IT executives after the SOX Act was enacted 
(Ppost(3.14%)>Ppre,(2.44%) p<0.001). The results support the hypothesis that SOX Act has an impact on the ITG as 
represented by the increased hiring of IT executives. 
 
Hypotheses Tests for Old and newly Created IT Executive Positions 
Figure 2 shows the trend for the IT executive positions that were filled between 1999-2005. In general, the old positions 
are more than the newly created positions. In the next table, Table 6, results are shown following the tests of the 
difference between the old positions and the new positions Pre and Post SOX. The Chi-Square test is significant 
(P<0.1) supporting the argument that these values are not a random occurrence. Also, the test of proportions is 
significant (P<0.05) supporting the hypothesis that firms created more new positions after the enactment of the SOX 
Act. 
 
Figure 2: Trend for the IT executive positions that were filled between 1999-2005 
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Frequency distribution- X2 and Fisher's exact 
 Pre-Sox Post-Sox Total X2(1) Pr -Chi Fisher 
 Two sided one sided 
Old Positions 323 260 583 2.82 0.093 0.096 0.055 
New Positions 93 99 192     
Total 416 359 775     
 
Proportions of CIOs Hires following creation of a new or existing position 
Pre-Sox Post-Sox Diff Post-Pre Z-Score Diff>0 Pro(Z>z) No. of observations 
93/323 99/260    Pre-Sox Post-Sox Total 
28.79% 38.08% 9.28% 1.68 0.047 416 359 775 
 
Table 6: Testing for the Difference between the Old and New Positions Pre and Post SOX 
Hypotheses Tests for IT Executives hired from within and Outside the Firm 
 
Figure 3 shows that firms hired more IT executives from outside the firm prior to 2002 but in 2003, there were an equal 
number of IT executives hired from outside and within the firm. However, after 2003, the hiring process reverted to the 
earlier trend. 
 
Figure 3: Comparing the Internal and External IT Executives Hires 
To empirically test whether firms hired more IT executives from outside than inside the firm, a Chi-Square test and a 
proportions test were carried out. Table 7 shows that the results are inconclusive although the proportions of IT 
executives who were hired from outside the firm after the passage of the SOX Act is greater and significant (p<0.1) than 
the proportions of IT executives who were hired from inside the firm. 
 
Frequency distribution- X2 and Fisher's exact 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total X2(1) Pr -Chi Fisher 
 Two sided one sided 
Outside Hires 256 203 459 1.863 0.172 0.187 0.098 
Inside Hires 160 156 316     
Total 416 358 775     
 
Proportions of CIOs Hires from Within and Outside the firm 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff Post-Pre Z-Score Diff>0 Pro(Z>z) No. of observations 
160/256 156/203    Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total 
62.50% 76.84% 14.35% 1.365 0.086 416 359 775 
 
Table 7: Comparing the Internal and External CIO Hires 
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Hypotheses Tests for Reporting Structures of hired IT executives 
 
Figure 4 shows the trend over the 1999-2005 periods for the reporting structure of the hired IT executives. There are 
two categories namely, IT executives who reported to the CEOs (includes Presidents, Chairmen, Chief Operating 
Officers) and CFOs & others. The ‘others’ includes IT executives who were reporting for instance to the VPs of 
Research and Development, Senior VPs of various departments and many more. Between 2001 and 2002, the data 
shows a decline in the number of IT executives that reported to the CEOs while the number of IT executives that 
reported to the CFOs and Others seem to rise. However, after this period, the chart shows a rise in the number of IT 
executives reporting to the CEOs while the values for the CFOs and others reverse back to the Pre-SOX period. 
 
 
Figure 4: Comparing the Reporting Relationship of the Hired IT Executives CIOs 
 
Frequency distribution- X2 and Fisher's exact 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total X2(1) Pr -Chi Fisher 
 Two sided one sided 
Non Reporting 295 211 515 5.94 0.015 0.015 0.009 
CEOs 104 115 219     
Total 399 326 734     
 
Proportions of CIOs Hires Reporting Relationships 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff Post-Pre Z-Score Diff>0 Pro(Z>z) No. of observations 
104/295 115/211    Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total 
35.25% 52.27% 17.02% 2.437 0.008 399 326 734 
 
Table 8: Testing the Reporting Relationship between IT Executive Hires Over the Study Period 
To generate a Pre and Post SOX comparison samples for testing the relationship between IT executive hires and 
reporting structure, the number of firms that detailed a reporting relationship (121 Pre and 136 Post) were subtracted 
from the total number of firms (416 Pre and 356 Post). The comparison samples are shown in Table 8. The results from 
the Chi-Square test support the argument that this data did not occur by chance (p<0.05) and also the hypothesis that the 
difference between the Pre and Post SOX is positive and significant (p<0.05). 
Hypotheses Tests for Business Backgrounds of Hired IT Executives 
To evaluate the business orientations of the hired IT executives, data was gathered (where available) about their 
bachelor’s degrees, masters degrees, and doctoral degrees. Most of the hired IT executives had acquired bachelor 
degrees in Computer Science/Engineering and Technology. An IT executive was considered to have a business 
orientation if they had acquired a master’s degree in a business related field (MBAs or MS in 
Finance/Accounting/MIS). Out of the 870 IT executives that were hired, there was available data about the master’s 
degree for 343 IT executives.   
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Figure 5: Masters Degrees Acquired by the Hired CIOs 
As shown Figure 5, majority of these degree were MBAs (includes Executive MBAs, MS Accounting/Finance/MIS). 
The figure also shows three other groups of graduate degrees namely; MS Computer Science (MS CS), MS Engineering 
(MS ENG) which include computer, electrical, and general engineering, and the ‘Others’ category which includes MS 
degree in physics, chemistry, and biology. To test the hypotheses, a comparison was made between the values for the IT 
executives with MBAs against the other master’s degrees. As shown in the following table, Table 9, below, the Chi-
Square test is significant (p<0.001). Also, the proportions test shows that the difference between the Pre-SOX and the 
Post-SOX is positive and significant (p<0.001). 
 
 
Frequency distribution- X2 and Fisher's exact 
 Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total X2(1) Pr -Chi Fisher 
 Two sided one sided 
Others 100 38 138 11.025 0.001 0.001 0.001 
MBAs 93 79 172     
Total 193 117 310     
 
Proportions of CIOs hires with Business Background 
Pre-SOX Post-SOX Diff Post-Pre Z-Score Diff>0 Pro(Z>z) No. of observations 
93/100 79/38    Pre-SOX Post-SOX Total 
93.00% 207.89% 114.89% 3.32 0.000 193 117 310 
 




In many organizations, there is a direct relationship between IT effectiveness and business operational efficiency due to 
the automation and transformation of processes throughout the business value chain (Holmes and Neubecker, 2006). 
Thus, CIOs serve critical roles when firms embark on SOX Act compliance initiatives. Besides managing the 
automation and transformation processes, CIOs are tasked with the roles of oversight over data analysis, systems design, 
systems development, and maintenance. Hence, the security, reliability, tolerance, and disaster recovery capability of 
the firm’s IT Infrastructures is the responsibility of the CIO’s office. Such undertakings guarantee that critical financial 
information can be extracted at any time and at any place by authorized personnel only. 
  
The role of CIOs in the SOX Act and the COSO framework is amplified by the fact that these legislations by themselves 
will never guarantee good corporate governance, but just like other laws, it is the efforts of people, organizational 
culture, business processes, firm control mechanisms, and strong management capabilities that ultimately determine 
compliance (Welch, 2005). In the modern firms, IT infrastructure represented by computers, emails, intranets, Internet, 
Web 2.0 tools, and IT personnel are the backbone of the day-to-day environment and it is only prudent for the IT unit 
and management to comprehend its scope and the enforcement provisions (Bequai, 2003). Since the SOX Act does not 
include IT compliance provisions, it is the role of the firms to devise means of meeting the compliance requirements. 
One of these means is increased attention to the IT unit which can be inferred through a number of scenarios. One of 
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these scenarios is an increased focus on the IT unit which would prompt firms to hire or create CIO positions to 
coordinate and manage the IT unit. 
 
A CIO is mandated with the role of heading the IT-unit (Gottschalk & Taylor, 2000) and is usually an IT-focused peer 
who can associate with other members of the top management team (TMT) on an equal footing. Thus by being part of 
the “inner circle”, the CIO is more likely to effectively educate, advise, and influence other Senior Executives 
(Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Ross and Feeny 2000). Research has demonstrated that CIOs add value to their 
firms through a number of strategies that include building relationships with senior executives, gaining the CEO 
confidence as well as making IT a major business competitive tool (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; Bharadwaj, 
2000). From the extant literature, it is evident that, firms cannot afford to ignore their IT executives while making SOX 
Act compliance decisions. In the modern firms, IT infrastructure in the form of computers, emails, intranets, Internet, 
Web 2.0 tools and other technologies are the backbone of the day-to-day environment and the ITG should play a leading 
role in aiding the IT and non-IT staff  and management to comprehend their scope and the enforcement provisions as it 
pertains to the SOX Act.  As earlier stated, SOX Act does not include IT compliance provisions and therefore it is the 
role of the firms to devise means of meeting the compliance requirements. 
 
Critics have argued that SOX Act is a financial legislation but this study has made a case for the fact that the role of IT 
in the compliance is inseparable since IT systems play a critical role in generating, changing, storing, and transporting 
data and information. Also, the researchers have illustrated through the research model that the role of ITG in dealing 
with the impact of SOX compliance, though implicit, is evidenced by the fact that SOX targets management 
accountability and operating efficiencies, which are two areas tightly coupled with the IT function. Moreover, many 
firms are actually inadvertently incorporating their CIOs in the SOX Act compliance committees as well as making 
direct investments in information systems meant to aid in SOX compliance.  
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The researchers hope that this research will further the debate on the role of ITG in the post SOX Act and spur more 
discussions. In fact, this research reinforces the anecdotal evidence that points to the fact that firms are spending more 
on IT to meet compliance standards but there is limited empirical research to support this assertion. An extension of this 
study should include a study seeking to confirm or debunk this assertion. Another extension would also include 
analyzing the new CEO hires to find out whether they are more biased towards IT. In light of the SOX Act, it would 
seem that more IT knowledgeable CEOs would seemly comprehend the IT requirements implicitly stated in the 
compliance requirements and be better at championing the ITG role. 
The IS literature has mainly used surveys or field interviews to investigate the various facets of ITG; however this study 
uses panel data spanning seven years from many firms which is a demonstration of the robustness and external validity 
of the study. However, there is still room for improvements in future studies. Additionally, this study focuses on the 
hiring trends and other CIO characteristics and we acknowledge that there are other characteristics associated with CIOs 
that might have an impact on corporate ITG. Future studies should investigate these characteristics such as the salary, 
firm size, firm industry reporting structures, and firm’s use of IT. Future studies should also investigate if CIOs abilities 
such as education, functional background, and experience closely match those of the other members of the TMT such as 
CEOs, CFOs, and COOs and how they impact firm performance. 
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